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1. Introduction
Rules on fiscal policy surveillance and financial sanctions
have been an integral part of Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU) since its inception. These provisions have,
however, always been a source of dispute. After a soft‐
ening of the EU’s budgetary surveillance framework in
2005, additional reforms were deemed necessary in the
aftermath of the financial crisis and the subsequent
sovereign debt crisis. Amongst others, this latest reform
intended to limit the role of the Council concerning the
imposition of sanctions (EU Regulation of 16 November
2011, 2011). The reform has indeed formally increased
the Commission’s power vis‐à‐vis the Council (Bauer &
Becker, 2014; Dehousse, 2016; Seikel, 2016; Van Aken
& Artige, 2013), without, however, discarding from the
rulebook the flexibility provisions introduced in 2005.
While the application of the surveillance rules was
never a purely technical exercise, the degree to which
political considerations should interfere with technical
surveillance is the source of recurrent debate. Similarly,
the respective roles of the Council and Commission, as
well as their relationship, are far from consensual and
static. While at the beginning of EMU, the Commission
was supposed to act as the technical supervisory author‐
ity, it has become clear under President Juncker that
the Commission is willing to enforce the budgetary
rules politically. This development continued under
Commission President von der Leyen, under whom the
fiscal requirements of the Stability andGrowth Pact (SGP)
were even temporarily suspended in the wake of the
COVID‐19 crisis. Despite the post‐crisis reinforcement of
coercive provisions, the Commission has indeed applied
the SGP flexibly (Mabbett & Schelkle, 2014; Schmidt,
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2016), and has not proposed sanctions based on the
SGP for non‐compliance with fiscal recommendations,
although this would have been possible in several cases.
This article, therefore, asks how we can best explain
why the Commission has so far refrained from proposing
financial sanctions.
This article will draw upon an adaptation of norma‐
tive institutionalism. It argues that while actor behaviour
follows a logic of appropriateness, actors act strategically
to pursue their objectives. Applying minimalist process‐
tracing methods, Commission behaviour is explained by
a mechanism that is entitled “normative‐strategic min‐
imum enforcement.” It argues that because punitive
action is not perceived as appropriate in the cases at
hand, the Commission strategically refrains from apply‐
ing existing enforcement provisions to their full extent.
This article will draw upon three post‐crisis cases
in which the imposition of sanctions for fiscal non‐
compliance was possible. These are the cases of Belgium
in 2013, France in 2015 and the double‐case of Spain and
Portugal in 2016.
The article is organised as follows. In the next sec‐
tion, the development of EU fiscal surveillance rules is
presented. Following this, the theoretical assumptions of
normative institutionalism and their implications for the
case studies are explained. After turning to the article’s
methodology, the cases are analysed as explained above.
The article ends with a summary of the findings and con‐
cluding remarks.
2. Rules and Rule Change in EU Fiscal Policy
Surveillance
Fiscal policy surveillance has been a fundamental part
of EMU since its introduction with the Maastricht Treaty
in 1992. It aims to prevent and correct budgetary
deficits and debt levels that respectively exceed 3%
and 60% of a country’s GDP. With the Excessive Deficit
Procedure (EDP), the possibility to impose financial sanc‐
tions for non‐compliance with the fiscal requirements
was present from the beginning of EMU. The degree
to which coercive provisions should be automatic, the
level of political discretion and the Council’s control over
the EU’s executive, were, however, constant sources of
political disagreement (see Heipertz & Verdun, 2010).
The SGP, adopted in 1997, consists of a preventive and a
corrective arm, with the latter operationalising the appli‐
cation of the EDP (Heipertz & Verdun, 2010; see also
Council Regulation of 7 July 1997, 1997). The SGP was
first reformed in 2005. This reform consisted in making
the SGP more flexible in that it, for example, relaxed the
definition of what counts as ‘exceptional economic cir‐
cumstances’ in the assessment of themember states’ fis‐
cal situation (Heipertz & Verdun, 2010, p. 168). Also, it
introduced the possibility to adopt a revised Art. 126(7)
recommendation with a new deadline for the correc‐
tion of an excessive deficit if a country has taken effec‐
tive action, but ‘unexpected adverse economic events
with major unfavourable consequences for government
finances’ had occurred (Council Regulation of 27 June
2005, 2005, p. 7).
In reaction to the sovereign debt crisis, fiscal
rules were again reformed. The Six‐Pack—the first set
of measures reforming the SGP in the wake of the
crisis–entered into force in December 2011. Sanctions
for non‐compliance with fiscal obligations could now be
introduced earlier and are more automatic. If for exam‐
ple, the Council, upon a Commission recommendation,
and per Art. 126(8) of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU, 2016), finds that a mem‐
ber state has not taken effective action to correct its
excessive deficit, the Commission is now required to rec‐
ommend to the Council the imposition of a fine of up
to 0.2% of the member state’s GDP (EU Regulation of
16 November 2011, 2011, Art. 6(1)). The Commission
can, however, recommend to the Council to reduce
or cancel the fine, on grounds of ‘exceptional eco‐
nomic circumstances or following a reasoned request
by the Member State concerned’ (EU Regulation of
16 November 2011, 2011, Art. 6(4)). In addition, with
the introduction of Reverse Qualified Majority Voting
(RQMV), Commission recommendations under the cor‐
rective arm of the SGP are considered as adopted by
the Council, unless there is a qualified majority that
rejects them (Bauer & Becker, 2014; EU Regulation of
16 November 2011; Treaty on Stability, Coordination
and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union,
2012, Art. 7).
For the Commission and its role in fiscal surveil‐
lance and enforcement, this means that it has seen its
competences and powers enhanced (Bauer & Becker,
2014; Dehousse, 2016). RQMV and the possibility to
trigger sanctions earlier in the procedure are likely to
add ‘significant political weight to the recommendations
of the Commission’ (Bauer & Becker, 2014, p. 220).
The Commission, at least on paper, has certainly gained
power vis‐à‐vis the Council, as it is now more diffi‐
cult for the member state representatives to reverse
the Commission’s recommendations. This simultane‐
ously gives the Commission a large degree of discretion
concerning the interpretation of fiscal rules (Dehousse,
2016; Seikel, 2016; Van Aken & Artige, 2013).
Indeed, despite the reinforcement of coercive pro‐
visions in the framework of the SGP, policy‐makers
have not taken back the above‐mentioned flexibility
provisions that were introduced with the 2005 reform.
What is more, the Six‐Pack has introduced even more
exemption provisions that form the so‐called “gen‐
eral escape clause” (see European Commission, 2020).
Therefore, considerable flexibility still exists concerning
the assessment of the fiscal performance of member
states (see also Mabbett & Schelkle, 2014). In its applica‐
tion of the reformed economic governance framework,
the Commission has indeed shown flexibility (Bekker,
2016) and leniency (Mabbett & Schelkle, 2014). Using
its discretion, the Commission has even reshaped the
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 163–172 164
coordination process (Vanheuverzwijn, 2017) and has
re‐interpreted the governing rules, applying them more
and more flexibly (Schmidt, 2016, 2020). While the
Commission under President Barroso did not acknowl‐
edge its flexible application of the rules and hid behind
an austerity‐oriented discourse, the Juncker Commission
made its more political and flexible stance public
(Schmidt, 2016, 2020). Nevertheless, the Commission
appears to signal its role as a determined supranational
surveillance body by increasing the number of country‐
specific recommendations tomember stateswith amore
polarised public opinion regarding the EU (van der Veer
& Haverland, 2018). While aiming at presenting itself
as empathetic towards member state authorities, the
Commission seems to avoid showing too much leniency,
suggesting that it tries to find the right balance in its
application of economic and fiscal surveillance rules (see
Vanheuverzwijn, 2017). Still, since the sovereign debt cri‐
sis and through policy‐learning, the views of Commission
officials have moved away from austerity orientation
towards a flexible and politicised view on fiscal gover‐
nance (Miró, 2020). In a similar vein, the Commission, in
its approach towards theArt. 7 procedure concerning the
non‐respect of the rule of law, prefers to find a solution in
cooperation with the government in breach of the rules,
rather than resorting to force (Closa, 2019).
3. Theory
In this article, it will be argued that although actors
strategically pursue their objectives, these objectives are
shaped by the actors’ perception of appropriate action.
An adaptation of normative institutionalism can help us
theorise and operationalise this claim. Normative institu‐
tionalism is rooted in sociology and emphasises the role
of institutional norms that proclaim appropriate action.
In that, it can be distinguished from sociological insti‐
tutionalism, which focuses more on cognitive aspects,
such as the perception and interpretation of situations
and problems, and less on the actors’ political behaviour
(Peters, 2019).
Normative institutionalism assumes that action is
driven by rules, which prescribe appropriate behaviour
(March & Olsen, 2011). Rules contain ‘codes of meaning,’
which ‘facilitate interpretation of ambiguous worlds,’
and ‘embody collective and individual roles, identities,
rights, obligations, interests, values, world‐views, and
memory’ (March & Olsen, 2011, p. 484). Consequently,
actors act according to what they perceive is appropriate
given their role and position (see March & Olsen, 1989).
Rules, however, are sometimes ambiguous. A change in
the situation in which actors find themselves may there‐
fore lead them to match the rules to the new situation.
This realignment consists of a ‘constructive interpreta‐
tion’ of the rules. By ‘fitting a rule to a situation,’ appro‐
priateness is established (March & Olsen, 2011, p. 483).
Although normative institutionalism does not
exclude cost‐benefit calculations (see March & Olsen,
2011), the central role that the logic of appropriateness
plays in the approach lends a structuralist tendency to
it, which leaves little room for agency (see Peters, 2019).
Therefore, and building upon the sociological critique
of the distinction between the logic of appropriateness
and the logic of consequentialism, it is assumedhere that
the two logics stand in an interdependent relationship:
while actors act strategically in pursuing their objectives,
these objectives are shaped by their institutional and
social environment (see Jenson & Mérand, 2010).
Based on these theoretical assumptions and the find‐
ings of the literature review presented above, the follow‐
ing expectations regarding Commission behaviour can
be derived. Given the Commission’s discretion and the
ambiguity of the SGP, the fiscal surveillance rules need
to be interpreted by Commission actors in light of the
situation at hand and in line with their perception of
their role and obligations. Thereby, appropriate action is
established. The main ambiguity of the rules stems from
their openness in that both a strict and flexible reading
and application are possible, and that the rules, there‐
fore, allow for ideologically, economically and politically
opposing policy choices to take form. The rules might
further enter into conflict with wider policy objectives
the Commission is pursuing, which reinforces the neces‐
sity to align rule application and perceived obligations.
The literature suggests that the Commission perceives
a flexible application of the rules—taking into account
the political, social and economic impact of its actions—
as appropriate (see Miró, 2020; Schmidt, 2020), without
however neglecting that being too lenient does not cor‐
respond to its role as surveillance body (see van der Veer
& Haverland, 2018; Vanheuverzwijn, 2017). In any case,
finding solutions cooperatively is expected to be pre‐
ferred to resorting to punitive action (see Closa, 2019),
especially because sanctions might be seen as inappro‐
priate given that under the SGP they would impose fur‐
ther costs on a country that is already in an economically
difficult situation (see Hodson & Maher, 2004). In pursu‐
ing the objectives, it deems appropriate, the Commission
is expected to act strategically.
4. Methodology
4.1. Process‐Tracing
The above‐mentioned expectations regarding Commis‐
sion behaviour will be tested in three case studies, apply‐
ing minimalist theory‐testing process‐tracing methods.
Process‐tracing allows us to trace a causal mechanism
that links a trigger or event X and an outcomeY (Fontaine,
2020; see also Beach & Pedersen, 2019; Bennett &
Checkel, 2015). Serving as a first test of the existence
of a causal link, in minimalist process‐tracing, the causal
mechanism is not unpacked in its entirety (Beach &
Pedersen, 2019). Nevertheless, mechanisms can still con‐
sist of different parts that are conceptualised as ‘entities
that engage in activities’ (Beach & Pedersen, 2019, p. 3)
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and linked ‘in a relationship of conditional dependence’
(Beach & Pedersen, 2019, p. 36). After spelling out what
fingerprints we expect the activities to have left, we have
to examine whether our empirical observations confirm
these expectations. If this is the case, the observations
can be regarded as mechanistic evidence that supports
our claims concerning the existence and functioning of
our theorised mechanism (see Beach & Pedersen, 2019;
Smeets & Beach, 2020). The Supplementary File 1 pro‐
vides an overview of the case‐specific observations.
Process‐tracing allows for making within‐case causal
inferences. However, we can also analyse several typical
cases–that is cases in which the cause and the outcome
are present–and examine whether the theorised causal
mechanism functions in the same way across our popu‐
lation of cases. At least at the level of abstraction of the
theorisedmechanism, this then shows that the cases are
mechanistically homogenous (Beach & Pedersen, 2019).
A mechanism provides only one possible link
between a trigger and an outcome, as X and Y can be
linked by several different mechanisms. Only if one
claims that a mechanism excludes other mechanisms,
it is, therefore, necessary to ‘formulate alternative expla‐
nations’ (Beach & Pedersen, 2019, p. 43; see also Beach
& Smeets, 2020).
In this article, it will be argued that the mecha‐
nism entitled “normative‐strategic minimum enforce‐
ment” links trigger—an EDP at a stage where the intro‐
duction of sanctions is possible—and outcome—the
non‐imposition of financial sanctions. It argues that
because punitive action is not perceived as appropri‐
ate, the Commission strategically refrains from applying
the enforcement provisions to their full extent. Building
upon expectations derived from the literature review
and the theoretical approach of this article, the mecha‐
nism consists of two parts.
Part 1 of the mechanism consists of the European
Commission assessing member states’ fiscal perfor‐
mance within the boundaries of the flexibility of the
rules. The Commission respects the limits of the flex‐
ibility of the SGP concerning the assessment of fiscal
performance, fulfilling its role as surveillance body and
Guardian of the Treaties. At the same time, the use of
flexibility provisions seems warranted if the data on fis‐
cal performance indicates a borderline case, as, in such a
situation, punitive action is not perceived as appropriate.
The fingerprints that would confirm the functioning
of this part are official documents, news coverage or
interview data that show that the Commission saw the
numbers as clear and accordingly respected the limits of
the flexibility it possesses, or that it saw the numbers
as unclear, which justified the use of relevant flexibil‐
ity provisions.
Part 2 of the mechanism consists of the European
Commission trying to avoid punitive action, resorting to a
flexible reading of the rules. Financial sanctions are seen
as inappropriate by the dominant Commission actors
because they are not in line with their perception of the
Commission’s role in fiscal policy surveillance. Therefore,
the Commission applies the rules in a way that does not
lead to the imposition of sanctions and accordingly acts
strategically in pursuing its objectives.
The fingerprints that would confirm the functioning
of this part are documents, news coverage or interview
data that indicate that the Commission believed that the
imposition of sanctions would not have been appropri‐
ate and that it read and applied the rules flexibly.
4.2. Case Selection
Although financial sanctions based on the SGP for non‐
compliance with fiscal recommendations have never
been imposed, there have been instances in which tak‐
ing such a procedural step was possible. For this study,
three cases have been selected that occurred after the
first post‐crisis reform of sanction provisions with the
Six‐Pack. These cases only concern euro area members,
as SGPprovisions regarding financial sanctions only apply
to this group of member states.
The cases selected are presented in Table 1. All cases
have in common that the member states concerned
were under an EDP and did not receive a financial
sanction. The cases diverge, however, in the procedural
steps undertaken. The case of France serves as a highly
politicised example of cases in which establishing non‐
effective action and thereby triggering sanctioning pro‐
visions was theoretically possible but not carried out.
The cases of Belgium, Spain and Portugal are the only
euro area post‐crisis cases in which non‐effective action
was established. Despite this finding, the Commission did
not issue a recommendation concerning sanctions in the
case of Belgium. While the Commission issued a formal
Table 1. Overview of case studies.
Case Existence of Establishment of Formal Recommendation/
excessive deficit non‐effective recommendation imposition of
(Art. 126(6) of action (Art. 126(8) concerning sanctions sanctions
the TFEU) of the TFEU) (EU Regulation
No. 1173/2011, Art. 6)
France 2015 Yes No — —
Belgium 2013 Yes Yes No —
Spain and Portugal 2016 Yes Yes Yes No
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recommendation in the case of Spain and Portugal, it pro‐
posed to cancel the fines. As the steps under the respec‐
tive EDPs of Spain and Portugal were largely dealt with
jointly by the Commission, the two cases are treated here
mostly as a single analytical entity.
For this article, 22 semi‐structured expert interviews
have been conducted with European Commission offi‐
cials both at service (DG ECFIN) and Cabinet‐level and
with National Government officials in Finance Ministries
and at Permanent Representations to the EU. The data
gathered will be used to uncover and confirm actions,
positions and perceptions of key actors. For triangula‐
tion, this article will additionally draw on official docu‐
ments and news coverage. Each interviewwas attributed
a code (see Supplementary File).
5. Analysis
Three post‐crisis cases will be analysed, in which the
imposition of sanctions for fiscal non‐compliance was
a valid option for decision‐makers–Belgium in 2013,
France in 2015 and Spain and Portugal in 2016. In line
with process‐tracing methods, each case study aims at
exploring whether the mechanism entitled “normative‐
strategic minimum enforcement” was present and func‐
tioned as theorised.
5.1. Belgium 2013
As the first euro area country under the reformed rules,
and still under the Barroso II Commission, Belgium was
found not to have taken effective action to correct its
excessive deficit. In light of this decision, the Belgian gov‐
ernment was facing the potential imposition of a fine
under the rules of the Six‐Pack. However, the Commission
did not issue any recommendation concerning sanctions.
The triggerwas that in 2009, in the wake of the finan‐
cial crisis, an EDP was opened for Belgium. At that point,
a deadline was set for the Belgian government to correct
its excessive deficit by 2012.
Part 1 of the “normative‐strategic minimum enforce‐
ment” mechanism suggests that the Commission
assesses fiscal performance within the boundaries of
flexibility: In 2013, the Commission assessed whether
Belgium had taken effective action concerning the
Art. 126(7) Council recommendation it had received in
2009. It found that it had failed to do so. It seems that
the data clearly indicated that Belgium had not achieved
its fiscal objectives.
Evidence shows that the decision to establish non‐
effective action was seen as rather technical. The
Commission’s assessment clearly showed that Belgium
had not undertaken the required action (COM 1).
According to the Commission’s assessment, even with‐
out the recapitalisation of the Dexia banking group that
amounted to 0.8%of its GDP, Belgiumwould havemissed
its deficit correction deadline (European Commission,
2013b). Even the Belgian administration perceived the
decision as a rather technical step that was in line with
the country’s fiscal performance (MS 2).
Part 2 of this mechanism suggests that the Com‐
mission tries to avoid punitive action: After the Council
confirms the Commission’s assessment of non‐effective
action, the latter is required to issue a recommendation
to the Council concerning the imposition of sanctions.
This recommendation can either contain a fine, or the
cancellation thereof. However, despite the Council con‐
firming that Belgium had not taken effective action, the
Commission did not issue any formal recommendation.
The Commission apparently resorted to a flexible read‐
ing of the rules to avoid punitive action in this case.
Evidence shows that in the decision not to pro‐
pose sanctions, legal considerations and arguments have
played a major role. The Belgian EDP had been launched
in 2009 and a Council recommendation was issued. It is
in response to this recommendation that in 2013 the
Commission deemed that Belgium had not taken effec‐
tive action. The Six‐Pack, based on which the establish‐
ment of non‐effective action should lead to a proposal
concerning sanctions, however, only entered into force
in December 2011. The Commission’s legal service ques‐
tioned the legal firmness of proposing a sanction in
this case (COM 1, COM 2). Indeed, a transition period—
although not necessarily mandatory—for the applica‐
tion of fines is foreseen in the recitals of the relevant
Regulation (EU Regulation of 16 November 2011, 2011,
Recital 21). In this vein, Olli Rehn, Vice‐President and
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs at the
time explained:
As the six‐pack legislation of reinforced economic gov‐
ernance entered into force only in mid‐December
2011, imposing a fine for the years 2010 or 2011
could go against the principle of non‐retroactivity
which is essential in European law. In my view,
therefore, it would be neither fair nor legally sound
to apply it retroactively to those years. (European
Commission, 2013a)
According to a Commission official, the possibility of
Belgium not paying the fine, of discussing the decision
being warranted, or of a court proceeding could have
undermined the credibility of the rules (COM2). Pursuing
the normative goal of good cooperation and the legality
and credibility of the rules in force, the Commission–in its
strategic thinking–therefore took into account that the
imposition of sanctions might have undermined achiev‐
ing its objectives.
Evidence suggests that how the European
Commission handled the French EDP in 2013 had also
played a role in the decision. Given that the Commission
aims at a consistent approach towards all member
states, Commission officials deemed it possible that the
lenient approach with regard to France, which at the
time was about to receive a two‐year deadline exten‐
sion (Fontanella‐Khan, 2013), might have contributed to
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the Commission not proposing a sanction for Belgium
(COM 3, COM 6).
Although Belgium did not fully deliver upon the
Council’s fiscal recommendations, it did not enter into
an open conflict with the surveillance framework, and
therefore the Commission did not see a reason to pun‐
ish Belgium (COM 1). In a similar vein, Olli Rehn stated
in a college meeting that the ‘undertakings on fiscal con‐
solidation given by the present Belgian government’ and
the ‘absence of a fully operational government’ in 2010
and 2011were reasons not to impose a financial sanction
(European Commission, 2013c, pp. 21–22).
In summary, when assessing the fiscal performance
of the Belgian government, the Commission found that
the numbers clearly indicated non‐compliance with the
recommendations. Therefore, it applied the rules in line
with its role as Guardian of the Treaties. However, when it
came to proposing sanctions against the Belgian govern‐
ment, the Commission opted for a prudent approach, not
applying the newly introduced provision, as it was in con‐
flict with several other norms. The legality of rule appli‐
cation, its consistency, and the cooperative behaviour
of the Belgian government were valued by Commission
actors and were in line with their perception of what the
Commission should aim for. They accordingly concluded
that sanctions that would undermine these norms were
not appropriate. In interpreting the rules and setting
aside a newprovision to achieve the objectives it deemed
appropriate, the Commission acted strategically.
5.2. France 2015
In 2015, asked by reporters why the Commission did not
sanction France for non‐compliance with the fiscal rules,
Jean‐Claude Juncker, then President of the Commission,
simply answered ‘because it is France’ (Guarascio, 2016).
Although this answer could potentially be explained by
Mr Juncker’s distinctive sense of humour, it seemed
to confirm widely‐held suspicions about the application
of the SGP. But was France treated differently simply
because of its size andweightwithin the EU?Or are there
other factors that explain the non‐imposition of sanc‐
tions in this case?
The trigger was that an EDP was opened for France
in 2009. In 2013, the deadline to correct the excessive
deficit was extended for two years—until 2015.
Part 1 of the mechanism was set in motion, and
in early 2015 the Commission assessed the French gov‐
ernment’s compliance with the Art. 126(7) Council rec‐
ommendation it had received in 2013. In its analysis of
France’s progress under the EDP, the Commission ser‐
vices did not come up with a clear assessment. While
the so‐called ‘bottom‐up assessment’ indicated that
France had complied with the Council recommendation,
the ‘top‐down assessment’ showed a ‘shortfall of 0.2%
of GDP compared to the recommendation’ (European
Commission, 2015b, p. 13). In line with this unclear pic‐
ture, the Commission’s overall assessment of the French
budgetary efforts stated that ‘… the information avail‐
able does not allow to conclude that the recommended
effort has not been delivered in 2013–2014’ (European
Commission, 2015b, p. 13). It seems that given the
unclear data, the Commission has assessed the French
fiscal performance using the flexibility of the rules.
The French case was the first major decision of the
Juncker Commission in the area of the SGP. Evidence
shows that in line with its announcement to be a “polit‐
ical” Commission, it had already made clear in January
2015 that it would use the flexibility that the SGP pro‐
vides (see European Commission, 2015a). As acknowl‐
edged by a Commission official interviewee, the assess‐
ment of the French fiscal situation was borderline,
also because the indicators the Commission is work‐
ing with at this stage are complex and sometimes diffi‐
cult to observe (COM 2). In line with the political and
flexible approach in the area of the SGP under the
Juncker Commission, ‘the bar of evidence required to
step up a procedure is relatively high,’ with the French
case being an example of this (COM 2). According to
another Commission official, given this unclear picture,
the Commission gave France the benefit of the doubt
(COM 1). It did so by effectively–notwithstanding the
double‐negative phrasing–concluding that France had
taken effective action, despite the weak numerical basis
for this.
Part 2 of the mechanism proposes that the Commis‐
sion tries to avoid punitive action: In its assessment, the
Commission did not detect non‐effective action, which if
found and adopted by the Council would have required
a proposal regarding sanctions. Instead, it recommended
extending the deadline for the deficit correction for two
years. It seems that the Commission has resorted to a
flexible reading of the rules to prevent punitive action.
Evidence shows that a pattern emerged during
this case regarding the internal conflict lines and bal‐
ance of power in the area. This pattern consisted
of Pierre Moscovici, Commissioner for Economic and
Monetary Affairs, being the advocate of a more flex‐
ible approach and Vice‐President Valdis Dombrovskis,
responsible for the Euro and Social Dialogue, advocating
a more rigid application of the rules. President Juncker
emerged as taking on the role of arbiter (COM 3; see
also Schmidt, 2020). Commissioner Moscovici argued
that ‘the Commission must be politically and techni‐
cally credible and must therefore use expertise and
the legal rules as the basis for making the right
political decisions.’ He was further of the opinion
‘that the European Semester was an opportunity for
the Commission to send messages to the member
states to correct their… budget deficits’ and that ‘the
Commission’s general approach must strike the right
balance between encouragement and a demand for
results’ (European Commission, 2015d, pp. 26–27).
In light of the Commission’s aim of encouraging reforms,
Commissioner Moscovici saw the imposition of sanc‐
tions as a failure for both the Commission and the
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member state concerned (see Chassany & Barker, 2015).
Vice‐President Dombrovskis, however, believed that ‘any
relaxing of these rules… would risk undermining the
procedure itself and the equity of this procedure, as
well as the Commission’s power to apply it’ (European
Commission, 2015d, p. 26).
Other than Vice‐President Dombrovskis, ‘a half‐
dozen other Commissioners,’ including Vice‐President
Katainen and Commissioner Vestager, were in favour
of concluding that no effective action had been taken
(Spiegel, 2015). In the absence of a compromise
between Commissioner Moscovici and Vice‐President
Dombrovskis, President Juncker backed Moscovici, and
concessions were made to Dombrovskis regarding the
extension of the deadline, granting two‐more years
instead of three (Spiegel, 2015), although there were
voices in the Council that were already critical of a two‐
year extension of the deadline (MS 1, MS 2).
Effectively concluding that France had taken effec‐
tive action, together with the finding that the eco‐
nomic situation was weaker than expected when
the recommendation had been issued, allowed the
Commission—according to Art. 3(5) of Regulation (EC)
No 1467/97—to extend the correction deadline (see
European Commission, 2015c). Accordingly, sanctioning
a member state based on rather weak and inconclusive
figures and taking the risk of receiving complaints after‐
wards was not in line with the Commission’s approach
on fiscal policy surveillance (COM 2) and its perception
of appropriate action.
In summary, the fiscal data were borderline and sub‐
ject to interpretation by the Commission, using the flex‐
ibility that the SGP provides. Against the background of
unclear data, a flexible reading of the ruleswas applied to
prevent punitive action that was deemed inappropriate
in the situation at hand. Rather than resorting to punish‐
ment, the self‐image of the dominant Commission actors
proclaimed acting towards improving the fiscal and eco‐
nomic situation in the member state concerned.
5.3. Spain and Portugal 2016
Spain and Portugal came the closest to the imposition
of sanctions. Both countries were found not to have
taken effective action to correct their excessive deficits.
While the Commission–as required by the rules of the
Six‐Pack–issued a formal recommendation to the Council
concerning the imposition of financial sanctions, it rec‐
ommended cancelling the fines.
The trigger was that Spain and Portugal had both
been under the corrective arm of the SGP since 2009.
In 2013, the deadline for the deficit correction for Spain
was set for 2016 and the one for Portugal for 2015.
Part 1 of the mechanism was set in motion and, in
2016, the Commission assessed the action of both mem‐
ber states concerning their respective Council recom‐
mendations. It found that both countries had not taken
effective action to correct their excessive deficits. The fis‐
cal data, therefore, seem to have clearly indicated the
countries’ non‐compliance with the recommendations.
Evidence shows that Commission actors saw the
establishment of non‐effective action for both Spain and
Portugal as a rather technical and straightforward deci‐
sion as the numbers were clear (COM 1, COM 2, COM 4,
COM 5, COM 7). So unlike in the case of France, in this
case, the establishment of non‐effective action directly
resulted from the analysis of the fiscal performance.
Part 2 of the mechanism suggests that the Com‐
mission tries to avoid punitive action: The Commission
issued formal recommendations concerning sanctions
following the Council’s confirmation of non‐effective
action. However, the recommendations contained the
cancellation of the fines. The Commission, therefore,
seems to have resorted to a flexible application of the
rules to prevent punitive action.
Evidence shows that, confronted with the legal
requirement to envisage punitive action against Spain
andPortugal, therewas a divisionwithin the Commission.
On the one hand, Commission actors in line with
the tougher approach represented by Vice‐President
Dombrovskis thought that the imposition of sanctions,
although of a symbolic amount (COM 5), would have
served the credibility of the fiscal surveillance framework
(COM 4, COM 5; see also Coman, 2018; Schmidt, 2020).
On the other hand, a strict application of the rules was
opposed by those Commission actors that were more
in line with the approach followed by Commissioner
Moscovici (see Coman, 2018; Schmidt, 2020). In particu‐
lar, the thought was that financial fines would have been
an additional fiscal burden, which could potentially have
had counterproductive effects (COM 2).
In a similar vein, punitive action was not perceived as
appropriate given the effort both countries had made in
the previous years (COM 2, COM 3). In light of this situ‐
ation, a fine would have been difficult to justify for the
Commission, as stated by a Commission official:
The political and the public perception of the
Commission proposing a fine… on countries that
were emerging from that sort of economic backdrop
and with that social backdrop still present… would
simply have been impossible for people to under‐
stand. And so Commissioner Moscovici was very
much of the view that sanctions were neither desir‐
able nor appropriate in that particular case. (COM 3)
A closely related aspect was of particular importance in
the Commission’s assessment of the appropriateness of
punitive action–the member states’ willingness to coop‐
erate. Both countries were seen as being cooperative
and were not questioning the surveillance framework or
intentionally disregarding their fiscal obligations (COM 1,
COM 2, COM 4, COM 7). As one Commission official put
it: ‘Spain and Portugal… did not deserve...to be punished
because their fiscal performance, all in all, despite not
being in line, was not in open conflict with the EU frame‐
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work’ (COM 1). With regard to other EU institutions, such
as the Council, given ‘a broad European consensus in
favour of cancelling the fines,’ Commissioner Moscovici
further ‘felt it wise not to take the risk of provoking unnec‐
essary divisions’ (European Commission, 2016, p. 28).
Ultimately, the Commission took a political decision in
not proposing sanctions (COM 1). It did so by taking into
account the reasoned requests submitted by the two gov‐
ernments, which allows the Commission to recommend
to the Council the reduction or cancellation of a fine
(EU Regulation of 16 November 2011, 2011, Art. 6(4)).
In summary, the assessment of the two member
states’ fiscal performance clearly showed that they had
missed their objectives. Accordingly, the limits of the flex‐
ibility provisions were respected and no leniency was
shown. However, when it came to the requirement to
propose sanctions, the Commission took into account
the economic, social and political situation, including the
countries’ recent effort and their willingness to cooperate,
and potential opposition from other institutions includ‐
ing the Council. Given the dominant actors’ self‐image as
representing a political body that aims at supporting eco‐
nomic improvement, sustaining a cooperative oversight
system and being responsive to the respective situation,
they concluded that sanctionswerenot appropriate in the
situation at hand. Consequently, the Commission applied
the rules flexibly to prevent the imposition of sanctions.
6. Conclusion
Despite the reinforcement of coercive provisions with
the post‐crisis reform of fiscal policy surveillance and the
strengthened role of the European Commission, it has
so far refrained from proposing financial sanctions for
non‐compliance with fiscal recommendations. This arti‐
cle aims to understand the Commission’s behaviour in
this regard. Applying an adaptation of normative insti‐
tutionalism, it is argued that the Commission strategi‐
cally refrains from using coercive provisions to their full
extent because sanctions are not perceived as appro‐
priate in the cases at hand. Testing this assumption, a
minimalist process‐tracing analysis shows that the mech‐
anism of “normative‐strategic minimum enforcement”
was present and functioned as theorised in the three
post‐crisis cases of near‐imposition of fines.
When assessing member states’ fiscal performance,
the Commission acts within the boundaries of its flexi‐
bility. If the data clearly indicates non‐compliance, the
Commission states that no effective action has been
taken. In line with its role as Guardian of the Treaties, it
avoids showing too much leniency. If, however, the data
on fiscal performance is less clear, it uses the flexibility
of the SGP and avoids steps that might lead to punitive
action. Even if based on its assessment of non‐effective
action, the Commission is immediately required to envis‐
age sanctions, it applies the rules in a way that ultimately
does not lead to the imposition of fines. Financial sanc‐
tions are seen as an inappropriate measure by the dom‐
inant Commission actors for several reasons. They are
economically counterproductive, they might create con‐
flict with member states that could damage the cred‐
ibility of the overall surveillance framework and they
would be difficult to justify vis‐à‐vis the European pub‐
lic. They accordingly go against the actors’ self‐image
of the Commission as an institution that should work
towards a cooperative and growth‐enhancing system of
economic and fiscal policy coordination and surveillance.
In a context of ambiguous rules, a strict reading of the
rules is therefore set aside to the benefit of a flexible
reading. This means that the Commission acts strate‐
gically in pursuing the objectives it deems appropriate.
On a theoretical level, this shows that strategy and norm‐
guided action can co‐exist. While the theorised and con‐
firmed norm‐based mechanism provides one explana‐
tion of Commission behaviour, it is well conceivable
that other theories andmechanisms equally explain why
the Commission refrains from triggering sanctions. More
research needs to be done to understand the explana‐
tory value of other factors.
Regarding themechanism’s external validity, it is con‐
ceivable that a similar mechanism provides an explana‐
tion of the outcome in the case of Italy in 2018–2019.
As in the cases studied in this article, the imposition of
sanctions for Italy was discussed but finally avoided by
the European Commission (see Schmidt, 2020). However,
in the course of discussions, the Italian government
moved its position from the overt rejection of the EU’s fis‐
cal surveillance framework to amore cooperative stance.
Given the conflictual behaviour of the Italian govern‐
ment, extending the explanatory value of the causal
mechanism might make a slight adaptation necessary to
sufficiently take into account the specificities of the case.
This could be the task of subsequent research.
To conclude, despite the reinforcement of coercive
provisions under the SGP, there is no automaticity in their
application. Cooperative behaviour and reform efforts—
even if small—are sufficient for the Commission in order
not to resort to punitive action. The idea of a cooper‐
ative relationship between the Commission and mem‐
ber states shapes the practice and the politics of the
SGP and appears to trump considerations concerning
the potential benefits that may result from imposing
financial sanctions. Despite some hawkish voices within
the Commission, most Commission actors seem less and
less inclined to trigger financial sanctions under the
SGP, thereby—at least indirectly—contesting the ben‐
efit and legitimacy of resorting to punitive measures.
The European Fiscal Board, the Commission’s indepen‐
dent advisory body on the implementation of fiscal rules,
goes so far as to call for abandoning financial sanctions
given their difficult enforceability in the current political
context. Instead, it calls for amove towards amore incen‐
tivising framework (see European Fiscal Board, 2020).
Surveillance under the SGP has been largely put on hold
in the wake of the COVID‐19 crisis and it is not yet
clear when or if the EU will go back to applying the
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fiscal surveillance framework in its current form (see
Fleming & Brunsden, 2020). If the rules are not reformed
and the current sanctioning provisions are maintained,
they will most likely stay there, never to be applied (see
European Fiscal Board, 2020), unless, perhaps, in the
case of a member state’s fundamental, overt and contin‐
uous rejection of the EU’s fiscal surveillance framework.
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